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RECENT CASES
Labor Law-Authorization Cards-Court Suggests Board Requirement That Employer Petition
for Election to Demonstrate Good Faith Upon
Rejection of Authorization Cards
Plaintiff unions' sought a National Labor Relations Board

(NLRB) bargaining order 2 alleging a violation of section 8(a)(5) of

the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 3 based on defendantemployers' refusal to recognize the unions when presented with authorization cards signed by a majority of the employees.' Plaintiffs
1. Truck Drivers Union Local No. 413, affiliated with International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, petitioned the court to set
aside a Board decision refusing to order Linden Lumber Division, Summer & Co., 190
N.L.R.B. No. 116 (June 7, 1971), to bargain with the union.
Textile Workers Union of America petitioned the court to review the Board's Second
Supplemental Decision and Order, 198 N.L.R.B. No. 123 (Aug. 21, 1972), refusing to issue a
bargaining order directed against Wilder Manufacturing Co.
2. The court in Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702 (1944), expressly declared a
bargaining order to be permissible under § 10(c) of the Act, which authorizes the Board to
fashion appropriate remedies.
Section 10(c) reads in pertinent part:
"If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall be of the opinion
that any person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair
labor practice, then the Board shall state its findings of fact and. . . take such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without backpay, as will effectuate the policies of this subchapter."
29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970).
3. Section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act provides that it shall be an unfair
labor practice for an employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of
his employees, subject to the provisions of § 9(a)." Section 9(a) provides that representatives
designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes shall be the exclusive representatives of all the
employees.
4. An authorization card can take many fornis; it may be a regular union membership
card, an explicit designation of the union as the signer's exclusive bargaining representative,
an application for union membership, or an authorization for the checkoff of union dues.
Generally, it is a printed form with appropriate blanks for the employee's name and/or
signature, employer's name and date. As used in this comment, authorization card means a
card giving the union authority to represent the employees in collective bargaining. Once a
union has obtained the signatures of a majority of the employees, it may present the cards
to the employer or to a neutral third party for a check against payroll records. If the employer
then refuses to recognize the union, the latter may -bring refusal-to-recognize charges according to § 8(a)(5) before the NLRB. See generally Comment, Refusal-to-Recognize
Charges Under Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA: Card Checks and Employee Free Choice, 33 U.
CM. L. Rav. 387 (1966).
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contended that the language and history of sections 8(a) (5) and
9(a) " of the NLRA and interpretative court decisions establish an
employer's duty to bargain whenever the union representative presents "convincing evidence of majority support."' Plaintiffs argued
that such convincing evidence was supplied in the instant cases by
submission of the authorization cards coupled with recognitional
strikes involving a majority of the employees. 7 Plaintiffs further
contended that an NLRB refusal to issue a bargaining order would
virtually eliminate the value of authorization cards as a means of
gaining employer recognition of unions. Defendant-employers
stated that they had no duty to recognize the unions when there had
been no prior voluntary agreement to determine majority status
through means other than an election and when the potential for a
fair election had not been seriously impeded by employer misconduct following the card presentation. After a series of Board opinions and court relitigation, s the Board supported the employer's
"voluntarist" view of the duty to bargain by refusing to issue a cardbased bargaining order absent employer misconduct or a prior
agreement. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, held, reversed and remanded. The NLRB's
refusal to issue a card-based bargaining order absent employer misconduct or a prior agreement is inconsistent with the policy of the
NLRA supporting alternative methods to an NLRB election; the
Board must adopt an option to test employer good faith such as an
5. See note 3 supra.
6. Since § 9(a) refers to the representative as the one designated or selected by a
majority of the employees without specifying precisely how that representative is to be chosen, it was early recognized that an employer had a duty to bargain whenever the union
representative presented "convincing evidence of majority support."
7. There were a number of indices in both of the instant cases that could have laid the
predicate for "convincing evidence of majority status;" in Wilder there was a strike in support
of the cards and an admission of respondent that the union had "10 or 11" of his employees:
in Linden Lumber, there was a recognitional strike and a renege on the employer's agreement
to abide by an election outcome after a "fresh" showing of a 30% support. The union argues
that these facts necessarily lay the foundation for a bargaining order.
8. In the Wilder case, the Board's initial decision on Oct. 21, 1968, found that the
company had not committed unfair labor prActices and dismissed the complaint. Subsequent
to the filing of the union's petition for review in the court of appeals, the Supreme Court
decided the related case of NLB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969), and the court
decided that the Board was the appropriate forum to consider initially the effect of the Gissel
opinion upon its prior decision. On Aug. 27, 1970, the Board issued a Supplemental Decision
and Order, 185 N.L.R.B. No. 175, finding that Wilder's course of conduct did violate
§ 8(a)(5). The Board filed an application for enforcement of this order, but following jurisdictional consideration and the recent decision in Linden Lumber, the Board moved to have the
case remanded to it, leading to the Second Supplemental Decision being appealed in the
instant court, 198 N.L.R.B. No. 123, (Aug. 21, 1972).
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employer petition for election under section 9(c)(1)(B) of the Act.
Truck Drivers Local 413 v. NLRB, 487 F.2d 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
Under the National Labor Relations Act, two methods have
developed by which a union can obtain recognition as the exclusive
bargaining representative of a previously unorganized group of employees. The first, based on section 9(c) of the Act,9 provides for an
election procedure by secret ballot on the petition of any interested
party-employee, union or management.' 0 This secret ballot election is controlled by strict regulations" designed to prevent management and union coercion of the voting employees. While the election
procedure maintains a "preferred status"' 2 as a means of establishing union representation, the Board has interpreted sections 8(a) (5)
and 9(a) of the Act so as to allow unions, in some instances, to
circumvent regulated secret ballot elections. Section 8(a)(5) provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to
bargain with the representative of a majority of his employees; section 9(a) defines representative as one "designated or selected" by
a majority of the employees, without specifying precisely how the
representative is to be chosen. Authorization cards, signed by a
majority of the employees and presented to the employer for examination, have become a popular method of informing the employer
of majority union status.' 3 If the employer refuses to recognize the
union following the card presentation, the union may, instead of

9. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(B) (1970).
10. Section 9(c)(1)(B) gives employers the right to file their own representation petitions. It allows for a petition "by an employer, alleging that one or more individuals or labor
organizations have presented to him a claim to be recognized as the representative defined
in subsection (a) . .. ."
11. See generally Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the NationalLabor Relations Act, 78 HARv. L. R~v. 38 (1964); Note, 72 YALE L.J.
1243 (1963).
12. The Court in Gissel noted that "secret elections are generally the most satisfactory-indeed the preferred-method of ascertaining whether a union has majority support."
395 U.S. at 602.
13. Employer knowledge of majority status may be secured in a number of ways. A
majority of the employees may inform the employer directly in groups, or individually, of
their own accord, or indirectly as a result of polling by the employer of employees. See
generally Shuman, Requiring a Union to Demonstrate Its Majority Status by Means of an
Election Becomes Riskier, 16 LAB. L.J. 426 (1965).
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filing a petition for an election, bring charges of refusal to bargain-an unfair labor practice according to section 8(a)(5)-against
the employer. If the union is successful in this proceeding, the Board
will issue a bargaining order to the employer." Compared to the 9(c)
election process, however, the card check method for gaining employer recognition has produced the following significant defects:
greater opportunity exists for coercion of employees b union organizers;15 employees may misunderstand the impact of signing an authorization card, because of misreading, failure to read, or union
misrepresentation;'" and, the employer may lose the opportunity to
speak to his employees concerning their decision to have union representation.' 7 For these reasons, the Board has emphasized that
authorization cards are not the functional equivalent of a certification election'8 and traditionally has limited the issuance of cardbased bargaining orders by certain judicial tests. In 1950, the landmark case of Joy Silk Mills Inc. v. NLRB'9 established the good faith
test; the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that if
an employer has a "good faith" doubt that the union lacks status
as a majority representative, the employer will not be charged with
an 8(a)(5) violation upon refusal to recognize."0 Under this Joy Silk
test, adopted in all other circuits, the union could disprove good
faith of the employer in either of two ways: by a showing that at the
time the union piesented its authorization cards the employer could
have no good faith doubt about the union's majority status; or by a
showing of employer misconduct, subsequent to the initial refusal
of recognition, which tended to dissipate the union's strength. Criticism directed at the difficulty of translating the undisclosed state
14. See note 2 supra.
15. See Comment, Refusal-to-Recognize Charges Under Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA:
Card Checks and Employee Free Choice, 33 U. Cm. L. REv. 387, 390 (1966).
16. See Note, Union Authorization Cards, 75 YALE L.J. 805, 823 (1965); cf. Lesnick,
Establishmentof BargainingRights Without an NLRB Election, 65 MICH. L. REV. 851 (1967).
17. Courts have protected the employer's right to influence the vote of his employees
through non-coercive speech. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537-38 (1945); Surprenant
Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 341 F.2d 756 (6th Cir. 1965).
18. See Cudahy Packing Co., 13 N.L.R.B. 526 (1939). See generally Comment,
Employer Recognition of Unions on the Basis of Authorization Cards: The "Independent
Knowledge" Standard, 39 U. CHI. L. Rav. 314, 318 (1972).
19. 185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 914 (1951).
20. The court stated: "[Ain employer may refuse recognition to a union when motivated by a good faith doubt as to that union's majority status. When, however, such refusal
is due to a desire to gain time and to take action to dissipate the union's majority, the refusal
is no longer justifiable and constitutes a violation of the duty to bargain set forth in section
$(a)(5) of the Act." 185 F.2d at 741.
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of mind of an employer into alegal finding of "good" or "bad" faith 2'
led to the "independent knowledge" test, which utilized more objective criteria for determining the employer's knowledge of majority
status. This new doctrine developed in Snow & Sons22 where the
employer had reneged on an agreement to have the cards authenticated by an impartial party and to be bound by such authentication. The test required that an employer who refused a union request for recognition based on an authorization card majority was
subject to a mandatory bargaining order if he had knowledge, independent of the cards, that the union possessed the support of a
majority of the members of a unit. The independent knowledge
doctrine assumed added significance when the good faith test was
expressly abandoned23 seven years later by the Supreme Court in
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.24 The Gissel decision held that the
NLRB has the authority to order an employer to bargain collectively
if he has committed unfair labor practices that interfere with the
potential for a fair election. Since under the Gissel standard, the key
to a bargaining order is the effect of employer misconduct on the
election process, the standard of good faith doubt is largely irrelevant. The Gissel decision, however, expressly left open the question
"whether a bargaining order is ever appropriate in cases where there
is no interference with the election processes."' ' Since a union's
right to rely on cards as a freely interchangeable substitute for elections where there had been no election interference was not put in
issue in Gissel, employer misconduct along with independent
knowledge remained the sole criteria for the issuance of a bargaining
order. Following the Gissel case, two Board decisions expanded the
independent knowledge test beyond the facts of Snow & Sons to
situations where the employer and employeds made no prior agree21. See generally Pogrebin, NLRB BargainingOrders Since Gissel: Wanderingfrom a
Landmark, 46 ST. JOHNs L. REV. 193 (1971).
22. 134 N.L.R.B. 709 (1961), enforced, 308 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1962).
23. The Board in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co. announced at oral argument that it had
virtually abandoned the Joy Silk doctrine altogether. The Court also summarized the Board's
position on the independent knowledge test at that time:
Thus, an employer can insist that a union go to an election, regardless of his subjective motivation, so long as he is not guilty of misconduct. . . .The Board pointed out,
however, (1) that an employer could not refuse to bargain if he knew. . . that a majority
of his employees supported the union, and (2) that an employer could not refuse recognition initially because of questions as to the appropriateness of the unit and then later
claim, as an afterthought, that he doubted the union's strength.
395 U.S. at 594.
24. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
25. Id. at 595. See generally Christensen & Christensen, Gissel Packing and "Good
Faith Doubt": The Gestalt of Required Recognition of Unions Under the NLRA, 37 U. CH.
L. REv. 411 (1970).
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ment. 6 In both decisions, the Board relied on evidence in addition
to authorization cards to draw the inference that the employer must
have known of the union's majority status. This evidence included
employer acknowledgement of card authenticity, his conversation
with employees, and a strike by the majority of the employees. More
recently, however, the Board has retreated from this expanding independent knowledge concept to the narrower holding of Snow &
7
Sons. In the 1970 case of Redmond Plastics,1
the Board identified
the "prior agreement" element as the critical factor; it found that
the employer's initial acknowledgement to union officers that they
appeared to have a union majority, together with a tentative agreement to talk with the union, justified the issuance of a bargaining
order. The instant Board decisions follow this restriction of the independent knowledge test; the employer has no duty to bargain absent
an agreement to determine majority status through means other
than an election. This recent position coupled with the Court's earlier rejection of the good faith test in Gissel has seriously limited the
effectiveness of authorization cards as a means of gaining union
recognition.
The instant court first briefly examined the statutory material
involved and noted that although elections enjoy a "preferred status" as a means of determining representation, they are not the only
predicate for a union claim to majority status. The court then described the development of the "independent knowledge" doctrine
and emphasized that the instant Board opinions represented a restriction of this standard; the only valid basis for an employer duty
to bargain was a prior agreement to let its "knowledge" be established through a means other than a Board election. The court reasoned that by restricting the independent knowledge test to the
prior-agreement situation, an employer's duty to recognize a union
can be triggered only by his own permission and therefore the effectiveness of authorization cards is seriously limited.2 The court
stated that the Board's "voluntarist" position was inconsistent with
the policies of the NLRA and argued that some alternative must be
devised to prevent an employer's deliberate disregard of union cards
without rhyme or reason. For cases involving neither a prior agree26. Wilder Mfg. Co.. 185 N.L.R.B. 175 (1970); Pacific Abrasive Supply Co., 182
N.L.R.B. 329 (1970).
27. 187 N.L.R.B. 487 (1970).
28. The court emphasized that the facts of Snow & Sons laid the predicate for a finding
of independent knowledge, not that a finding of independent knowledge was restricted to such
facts.
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ment nor employer misconduct; the court proposed a new test for
issuing a bargaining order, which it felt was related to independent
knowledge and its good faith predecessor: the failure of the company
to evidence its own "good faith doubt" by itself petitioning for an
election indicates recognition of majority status and a bargaining
order may ensue. The court reviewed the legislative history of section 9(c)(1)(B) of the 1947 amendment, which provides the employer with the right to petition for an election, and noted that it
was designed to allow the employer to test its doubts as to a union's
majority. 9 Relying on this legislative history and a desire for a compromise standard, the court proposed that since authorization cards
create a sufficient probability of majority support, an employer
should resolve any doubt of majority status through a section
9(c)(1)(B) petition for election if it is to avoid a bargaining order.
In accordance with the policy of the NLRA, the instant decision
attempts to ensure the effectiveness of authorization cards as an
alternative means of gaining employer recognition of union representation. The abandonment of the "good faith" test, the restriction
of the "independent knowledge" test and the limitation of the Gissel
holding to employer misconduct situations have combined to limit
the scope of an employer's duty to bargain upon presentment of
authorization cards. The court sets forth a proposed rule to prevent
deliberate employer disregard of authorization cards in situations
where there has been no Snow & Sons prior agreement or Gissel
employer misconduct. In placing the burden of affirmative action-petitioning for an election-on the employer, the proposed
rule aims to maintain the delicate balance between authorization
cards and the election process; since cards do not become the functional equivalent of an election, the "preferred status" of elections
is preserved while authorization cards retain their value at the same
time. In addition, the proposed rule may cure several defects that
exist in current Board procedures for handling authorization card
situations2 For example, the proposed rule should result in a speedier election process because it would help obviate employer use of
delaying tactics. The current independent knowledge standard cre29. The court cited the statements made in Gissel regarding § 9(c)(1)(B):
That provision was not added, as the employers assert, to give them an absolute
right to an election at any time; rather it was intended, as the legislative history indicates, to allow them, after being asked to bargain, to test out their doubts as to a union's
majority in a secret election which they would then presumably not cause to be set aside
by illegal antiunion activity.
395 U.S. at 599.
30. See Comment, supra note 18.
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ates an incentive not to recognize the union, but rather to prolong
a. pre-election hearing3 ' or to withhold recognition until the union is
forced to initiate a lengthy 8(a)(5) proceeding. By requiring the
employer to satisfy its doubts by an election petition, the rule would
decrease the possibility that an employer would succeed in the section 8(a)(5) proceeding. The employer should be more likely to grant
recognition immediately or petition for an election, thereby avoiding the lengthy proceedings that occurred in the instant case. Despite these potentially beneficial effects of the proposed rule, it is
questionable that its practical application will actually reinforce the
utility of authorization cards as a direct means to the end of union
recognition. An initial question arises as to why an employer would
not petition for an election every time it was presented with authorization cards in order to gain time and utilize the safeguards of the
election procedures. If employer petition upon presentment of cards
becomes a matter of course, how should the Board or a court determine when an employer has petitioned for an election to remove its
good faith doubt and when it has so acted simply out of a desire to
avoid union recognition? This question of good faith raises once
again the criticisms of subjectivity which were directed at Joy Silk,
in the face of the Board's warning in Summer & Co. that "it did not
wish to reenter the good faith thicket of Joy Silk." Nonetheless, if
authorization cards are to be an independent means of obtaining
union recognition, this subjective evaluation of employer state of
mind becomes necessary. Since the potentialfor adequately policing
employer petitions for election appears slim at best, the court
should recognize that the independent effectiveness of authorization
cards has not really been preserved; rather the election process
merely has been expedited through the use of authorization cards.
The courts should evaluate the cards' utility in attaining a smoother
election procedure and determine whether the election procedure
could operate just as efficiently without the use of the troublesome
cards at all.
31.

Id. at 326.
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Labor Law-Protected Activity-Concerted Activity in Protest of Racial Discrimination and
Without Union Authorization by Employees Dissatisfied with Union Efforts is Protected by § 7 of
the NLRA
Petitioner instituted unfair labor practice proceedings against
a California department store' on behalf of dissident union members
who were discharged for picketing in protest of alleged racial discrimination by their employer. The employees in question had set
up pickets without union authorization 3 after becoming dissatisfied
with investigations of discrimination charges conducted by the
union and employer in accordance with the collective bargaining
agreement.' Petitioner contended that the picketing employees were
engaged in concerted activity protected from employer interference
by section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) . The
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) ruled that the concerted
activity was unprotected and the discharges lawful because the
picketers' actions were in derogation of the union's status as exclu1. Respondent Emporium Capwell Co., through its bargaining agent, the Retailer's
Council, was a signatory to a collective bargaining agreement with the Department Store
Employees Union, exclusive bargaining representative of Emporium's stock and markingarea employees. The collective bargaining agreement contained an anti-discrimination
clause, a no-strike clause, and provided for an adjustment board and binding arbitration for
dealing with agreement disputes.
2. Petitioner charged that by firing employees Hawkins and Hollins, the employer
violated § 8(a)(1) of the NLRA, which provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer-(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 157 of this title. . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1970).
3. The union filed a protest with the Retailer's Council challenging the firings, but did
not authorize the strike or initiate the instant action.
4. Five months after receiving employee complaints of employer racial discrimination
in promotions, the union charged the employer with discrimination and demanded an adjustment board proceeding. After announcing that it would demand arbitration if necessary, the
union rejected the suggestion of several employees that a strike be called and expressed the
intent to utilize the grievance procedure of the collective bargaining agreement. At the adjustment board meeting, 4 employees, including Hawkins and Hollins, refused to participate in
grievance adjustment on an individual case basis and demanded that discrimination be
considered as it affected non-white employees of the company as a group. The employees also
demanded a meeting with employer's president and staged a walkout. After the refusal of
employer's president to negotiate directly, employees Hawkins and Hollins picketed employer's store and were fired.
5. Section 7 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970) provides: "Employees shall have the
right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection ....
"
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sive bargaining representative.' On appeal to the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, held, order reversed
and case remanded for further proceedings. 7 When employees engage in concerted activity without union authorization to protest
racial discrimination, such concerted activity is protected by section
7 of the NLRA, if after initially utilizing union grievance procedure
the employees have a reasonable belief that the union is not opposing discrimination to the maximum extent possible. Western Addition Community Organization v. NLRB, 485 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir.
1973), cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3468 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1974) (No. 73-

830).
The right of employees to engage in concerted activity' for the
purpose of collective bargaining and the protection of that right
°
from employer interference-as embodied in sections 71 and 8(a)'
of the NLRA-are central components of national labor legislation.'1 Moreover, the courts early recognized that efforts to eliminate
2
racial discrimination are within the scope of "labor disputes"' and
may constitute protected concerted activities.' 3 National labor policy has provided additionally, through section 9(a)'4 of the NLRA,
that the elected union representative should be the exclusive agent
6. The NLRB adopted the Trial Examiner's decision in favor of the employer, Members
Jenkins and Brown Dissenting. 485 F.2d at 924.
7. The court remanded on the issue of whether the language used by the picketing
employees constituted disloyalty sufficient to remove the activities from the protection of § 7.
The court cautioned the NLRB, however, to closely examine the facts to ensure that the
firings were not motivated by racial discrimination or employer adversity toward concerted
activity. See NLRB v. IBEW Local 1229, 346 U.S. 464 (1953) (discharge of employees who
publicly disparaged employer's television broadcasts not an unfair labor practice); PattersonSargent Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 1627 (1956) (discharge of strikers carrying disloyal signs not an
unfair labor practice).
8. "Concerted activity" refers both to employees' actions and the legal status of those
actions, and as a result the term "protected concerted activity" has been utilized to indicate
such activity which is protected by law from employer interference. See NLRB v. Washington
Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14-17 (1962); NLRB v. Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd., 419 F.2d 216,
221 (9th Cir. 1969); Note, ConcertedActivity UnderSection 7 of the NationalLabor Relations
Act, 1955 U. ILL. L.F. 129.
9. See note 5 supra.
10. See note 2 supra.
11. See TiE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 22-24, 28 (C. Morris ed. 1971); Getman, The Protection of Economic Pressure by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 115 U. PA. L.
REV. 1195 (1967).
12. New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552 (1938).
13. NLRB v. Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd., 349 F.2d 1, 4 (1965), on remand, 166 N.L.R.B.
551 (1967), vacated and remanded, 419 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1969); Mason-Rust, 179 N.L.R.B.
434 (1969).
14. Section 9(a) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970) provides: "Representatives
designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the
employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay,
wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment .... "
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of the members of the collective bargaining unit.'5 This principle of
exclusivity is designed to create a means by which the demands of
the union majority may be translated into a single bargaining position. The representative communicates the bargaining position to
the employer, thereby creating a more orderly system of collective
bargaining" and also protecting the employer from conflicting demands of numerous groups of workers." A series of "wildcat" strike8
cases, involving employees striking without union authorization,'
has presented problems in reconciling section 7's protection of concerted activities with section 9(a)'s principle of exclusivity. The
Fourth Circuit in NLRB v. Draper"approved the firing of a minority group of strikers on the basis of the exclusivity principle, reasoning that collective bargaining would lose its effectiveness if small
groups of employees could ignore their exclusive agent. 2 The Fifth
Circuit initially adopted a position more amenable to minority
strikers in NLRB v. R. C. Can Co.,2 holding that minority concerted
activity in support of the union position is not in derogation of the
exclusive status of the union and therefore does not lose the protection of section 7.22 A later Fifth Circuit decision, however, narrowly
limited R. C. Can to cases where the minority action is consistent
15. The § 9(a) principle of exclusivity is enforced by § 8(a)(5) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(5) (1970), which makes it an unfair labor practice for the employer to refuse to
bargain with the elected union representatives or to bargain with splinter groups. See, e.g.,
Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678, 684 (1944).
16. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967); Medo Photo Supply
Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678, 685 (1944); NLRB v. Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd., 419 F.2d 216,
220 (9th Cir. 1969); Plasti-Line, Inc. v. NLRB, 278 F.2d 482, 486 (6th Cir. 1960). See also
National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
17. NLRB v. Draper Corp., 145 F.2d 199, 203 (4th Cir. 1944); see NLRB v. Tanner
Motor Livery, Ltd., 419 F.2d 216, 221 (9th Cir. 1969). Another benefit of this structure is the
more effective use of the economic strength of the workers. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.,
388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967); NLRB v. Draper Corp., 145 F.2d 199, 203 (4th Cir. 1944). An
additional result is the avoidance of unequal treatment of groups within the bargaining unit.
II LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 3070 (NLRB 1949).
18. A "wildcat" strike is defined as "a work stoppage, generally spontaneous in character, by a group of'union employees without union authorization or approval." H. ROBERTS,
DICTIONARY OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

461 (1966).

19. 145 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1944).
20. 145 F.2d at 203. A number of other circuits have followed the Draperdecision. See,
e.g., Lee A. Consaul Co. v. NLRB, 469 F.2d 84 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam); NLRB v.
Sunbeam Lighting Co., 318 F.2d 661 (7th Cir. 1963); Plasti-Line, Inc. v. NLRB, 278 F.2d 482
(6th Cir. 1960).
21. 328 F.2d 974 (5th Cir. 1964).
22. The Fifth Circuit, in addition, held that if the minority group criticizes or opposes
union positions then the group's activity is divisive and unprotected. 328 F.2d at 979; see
Western Contracting Corp. v. NLRB, 322 F.2d 893 (10th Cir. 1963).
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with all positions of the union.2 Minority strikes involving the issue
of employer racial discrimination present courts with an additional
problem in light of the exclusivity principle; the situation may involve white union leaders who are unresponsive or even hostile to
black members 24 thereb3i escalating the pressure for minority members to engage in concerted activity against the employer in order
to get adequate representation. 25 In NLRB v. TannerMotor Livery,
Ltd., 26 the Ninth Circuit considered the question of protection of the
concerted activities of employees who were fired for picketing in
protest of employer racial discrimination where the employees made
no attempt to bargain through their union representative. The
court, relying on Draperand on two recent Supreme Court decisions
emphasizing the exclusivity principle, 27 held that the concerted activities were not protected. Although the Ninth Circuit concluded
that section 9(a) requires that the employees assert their demands
through their union,2s the court did not specifically pass on the
question of section 7 protection where the employees initially utilize
union machinery and then resort to concerted activities out of dissatisfaction with union efforts to end discrimination. Thus, while
the section 7 right of employees to engage in concerted activity
against employer racial discrimination has been limited to some
extent by the exclusivity principle of section 9(a), no definitive approach to this prcblem has yet been exhibited by the courts.
Considering the right of an employee to non-discriminatory
treatment, the instant court held that this right differs from other
conditions of employment because of its independent statutory base
23. NLRB v. Shop Rite Foods, Inc., 430 F.2d 786, 791 (5th Cir. 1970).
24. See Gould, Black Power in the Unions: The Impact Upon Collective Bargaining
Relationships, 79 YALE L.J. 46 (1969); Kovarsky, Current Remedies for the Discriminatory
Effects of Seniority Agreements, 24 VAND. L. REv. 683, 686-87 (1971).
25. Although the union is under a duty of "fair representation" to its black members,
the-general legislative dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of this doctrine resulted in Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1970), which guarantees
the right of employees to be free of racially discriminatory employment practices. See Syres
v. Oil Workers Local 23, 350 U.S. 892 (1955); Steele v Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192
(1944); Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v Duke Power Co. and the Concept of
Employment Discrimination,71 MICH. L. REv. 59. 87 (1972); Kovarsky, supra note 24, at 68687.
26. 419 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1969).
27. The Tanner court found in the Allis-Chalmers and Scofield decisions a growing
emphasis on ensuring the free expression of employee demands within the union, with the
result that added weight should be given the majority position. See Scofield v. NLRB, 394
U.S. 423 (1969); NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
28. 419 F.2d at 221.
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in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.29 The court concluded
that the exceptional character of concerted activities involving racial discrimination should have been recognized and considered by
the NLRB in its decision." The court next distinguished the instant
situation from the Tanner case in which the strikers made no attempt to utilize the established grievance procedures and held that
an initial resort to the union's established procedures is essential for
section 7 protection of concerted activities. The court then turned
to the efforts of the strikers' union representatives and concluded
that while the union appeared to be representing the dissident employees in good faith, it may not have been proceeding "to the
fullest extent possible, by the most expedient and efficacious
means."3' The court ruled that the eradication of discrimination
cannot be subjected to less than this high standard of representation, and thus the employees had reasonable grounds to believe that
they were not being adequately represented by the union. The court
next focused on the interference of this minority concerted activity
with section 9(a). The court found that the basic premise of exclusivity-majority rule producing a single bargaining position-is not
defeated by minority activities opposing racial discrimination because the union majority is itself compelled by Title VII to oppose
discriminatory policies. The court, although conceding that the actions of the strikers were disruptive of the collective bargaining
process, reasoned that the instant strike was not sufficiently disruptive to remove section 7 protection.3 2 The court therefore concluded
that due to the privileged position of racial disputes, concerted activities protesting racial discrimination should be protected by section 7 when the following conditions are met: initial utilization of
established union grievance procedures and a reasonable employee
belief that the union is not proceeding to the maximum extent in
29. See note 25 supra. In addition, the court noted that peaceful picketing in protest of
employer discrimination is specifically protected from employer interference under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1970) which provides: "It shall be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees
. . . because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this
subchapter ... " Cf. Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 463 F.2d 337, 341 (8th Cir. 1972),
aff'd, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
30. See Gould, On Labor Injunctions, Unions, and the Judges: The Boys Market Case,
1970 Sup. CT. REV. 215, 260-61.
31. 485 F.2d at 931.
32. The court also noted that the strikers pursued the established grievance procedure
until the union declined to proceed on a group basis, and not until that point did disruption
occur. 485 F.2d at 929-30.
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opposing discrimination. 33
The instant decision's significant departure from those prior
"wildcat" strike cases relying on the Draperexclusivity rationale,3 4
and the opposite results reached in the instant case and the Ninth
Circuit's Tanner decision, 3 indicate an apparent split in the District
of Columbia and Ninth Circuit's approaches to section 9 in racial
discrimination cases." By "immunizing" labor disputes involving
racial discrimination from the exclusivity requirement,37 the court
has aided minority group employees in their struggle by creating an
additional avenue by which discrimination in employment can be
combatted and by reducing the obstacle of unresponsive union representation.3 At the same time the court has attempted to preserve
orderly collective bargaining by limiting section 7 protection to
employees who have at least initially utilized union grievance procedures. The instant decision, however, does present three major
problems. First, the right to act outside of union representation
must be viewed in terms of the employee's reasonable belief that
union representation has been inadequate, 39 and this "reasonable
belief' criterion will create an uncomfortable dilemma for the employer who is faced with minority concerted activity. If the employer
bargains directly with the dissident group, he may face unfair labor
practice charges by the union under section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA
which prohibits ihe employer from bargaining with union splinter
33. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Wyzanski found that the position of the strikers
was in derogation of the union because any advances made by non-white workers must
necessarily be at the expense of white employees. Judge Wyzanski, however, concluded that
where racial discrimination is involved an exception to the exclusivity rule must be created.
In addition to Title VII policies noted by the majority, Judge Wyzanski found a basis for this
exception in the essential injustice of requiring that non-whites asserting their rights "BE
RELEGATED TO WHITE SPOKESMEN, MIMICKING BLACK MEN." The Judge
concluded that "THE DAY OF THE MINSTREL SHOW IS OVER." 485 F.2d at 940.
Judge Wyzanski dissented from the majority's remand, and argued that the NLRB should
be ordered to grant relief to petitioner. 485 F.2d at 941.
34. See 485 F.2d at 926-27, 938.
35. The Tanner court specifically rejected the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in R.C. Can that
a minority strike in support of the union position does not derogate from the union's exclusivity and is therefore protected. 419 F.2d at 221; see note 22 supra.However, the instant court's
reasoning-since the majority is compelled by law to oppose discrimination, minority strikes
opposing discrimination do not derogate from the majority-sounds more akin to R.C. Can
than to Tanner.
36. See 485 F.2d at 940.
37. See Gould, supra note 30, at 260-61.
38. See also Gould, Racial Equality in Jobs and Unions, Collective Bargaining,and the
Burger Court, 68 MIcH. L. Rxv. 237-38 (1969).
39. 485 F.2d at 931.
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groups. 0 Moreover, if the employer fires the dissidents after incorrectly gauging as unreasonable their belief that union representation has been inadequate, he is in violation of section 8(a)(1) which
prohibits employer interference with the exercise by employees of
section 7 concerted activity.4' If the employer does nothing, he faces
economic losses from disruption caused by the strikers." Secondly,
objection may be raised to the court's standard of adequate union
representation.4 3 In the instant case, the union was admittedly proceeding in good faith in what it felt was the most efficient manner."
The court's determination that the union had not fulfilled the "high
standard" of representation creates doubts that any union representational effort, short of calling a strike, can stand the test where
objections from racial minorities arise." If the standard is indeed
that stringent, the court's requirement that members resort to union
representation is rendered essentially meaningless." A third, more
basic objection to the decision is found in the court's use of the Title
VII anti-discrimination policy to immunize the strikers from the
exclusivity requirement.4" Title VII not only makes discrimination
in employment illegal, but also provides an orderly system by which
discrimination complaints may be processed." Title VII's policy of
negotiation and conciliation, in conjunction with the recognized
NLRA policy of orderly collective bargaining, weighs in favor of
discouraging minority concerted activity, even within the context of
40. See note 15 supra. In situations similar to the instant case where the union position
is closely linked to that of the strikers, the danger of § 8(a)(5) charges would appear to be
remote. But where the union is in opposition to minority strikers, indicating a greater possibility of inadequate union representation, the employer's dilemma could become acute. See
Getman, supra note 11, at 1246-47; Gould, supra note 24, at 67.
41. See note 2 supra.
42. The employer's dilemma should also be viewed in terms of the collective bargaining
process. The employer often gives up significant concessions to the union, including the
binding arbitration clause, in order to obtain a no-strike agreement. The employer's, and
indeed the union's, reliance upon an orderly system of grievance adjustment for the purpose
of insulating production from industrial strife may be defeated by the instant decision. See
note 40 supra.
43. See note 31 supra.and accompanying text.
44. "There is nothing in the record before us to indicate that the Union's decision to
remedy the charges of discrimination by proceeding on an individual rather than a group or
class basis was made in bad faith." 485 F.2d at 930.
45. See 485 F.2d at 931.
46. See id. at 929.
47. See notes 29-30 supra and accompanying text.
48. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4, -5 (1970), Meltzer, Labor
Arbitration and Overlapping and Conflicting Remedies for Employment Discrimination,39
U. CH. L. REv. 30, 47 (1971) See also Sape & Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: 'The Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 824, 862-63 (1972).
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a discrimination protest. Dissident union members have access to
several major alternative remedies including Title VII protection,"9
state anti-discrimination laws,O suit for breach of the collective bargaining agreement,5 ' and other federal statutory provisions. 2 The
availability of these nondisruptive means of combatting racial discrimination-in particular the remedies under Title VII-should
make concerted 53activity by dissidents not only unnecessary, but
also undesirable.

"49. See note 25 supra. The enforcement scheme of Title VII, as amended by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, provides that the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) will investigate charges of discrimination and determine if there is
reasonable cause to believe that the chhrges are true. Upon finding reasonable cause, the
EEOC.must make efforts to conciliate the case, and failing to obtain conciliation, the EEOC
may bring a civil action in an appropriate federal district court. Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 4(a),
86 Stat. 104 (1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1970). See generally EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPoRTuNIrrY COMMISSION, 7TH ANNUAL REPORT (CCH LAB. L. REP., Aug. 23, 1973); Sape
& Hart, supra note 48, at 862-64.
50. See, e.g., Beaird, Racial Discriminationin Employment: Rights and Remedies, 6
GA. L. REv. 469, 472-73 (1972); Hebert & Reischel, Title VII and the Multiple Approaches to
Eliminating Employment Discrimination, 46 N.Y.U.L. REv. 449, 455-56 (1971);
Developments in the Law-Employment Discriminationand Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1109 (1971).
51. See Beaird, supra note 50, at 474-76; 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 230.
52. See Peck, Remedies for Racial Discriminationin Employment: A Comparative
Evaluation of Forums, 46 WASH. L. REv. 455, 489-91 (1971).
53. See generally Meltzer, supra note 48; Spelfogel, Wildcat Strikes and Minority Concerted Activity-Discipline,Damage Suits and Injunctions, 24 LAn. L.J. 592, 608 (1973). But
see Cox, The Right To Engage in ConcertedActivities, 26 IND. L.J. 319, 332 (1951).

